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Abstract   
Subsidizing energy has been widely used but is economically unfavorable. The Malaysian 
government has shown strong intention to reduce energy subsidies recently, but face challenges to 
prepare policy instruments to manage the impact. This study develops a Computable General 
Equilibrium (CGE) model with breakdown of households by income level to evaluate the potential 
impacts of removing energy subsidies on the Malaysian economy. It is shown that removing 
petroleum and gas subsidy would improve economic efficiency and increase GDP up to 0.65%. 
Budget deficit would be largely reduced after removing the petroleum subsidies, especially when 
the saved subsidy cost is not budgeted for other expenditure. Households would be worse off in 
most scenarios due to higher price level, but some compensation policy could make the lowest 
income group no worse than baseline, without harm the economy. The reduction in carbon 
emissions ranges 1.84-6.63% in different scenarios. The simulation results suggest Malaysia to 
completely remove all fuel subsidies and use the saved funding to cut budget deficit or spend on 
education, health and other service sector. It is also necessary to set a compensation scheme to 
minimize public resistance and make sure such scheme is affordable. 
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Subsidy has been an important energy policy instrument in many countries due to social and 
political concerns, but is widely deemed as economically unfavorable. Although different in form, 
energy subsidies generally work by directly or indirectly lowering the net amount paid by energy 
consumers or raising the effective price received by energy producers (IEA, 1999). Subsidies to 
energy products make consumers lack incentive to conserve energy, as the subsidized energy prices 
cannot reflect the true costs of energy supply and disclose adequate information of resource scarcity. 
Subsidies to energy producers also hamper their efforts to optimize production and adopt more 
advanced technologies. Over-use of energy caused by both types of subsidies would accelerate the 
depletion of fossil resources and aggravate environmental degradation (e.g. climate change, acid 
rain and air pollution). 
From social perspective, as differentiating customers is costly in practice, energy subsidies to 
households are usually applied to all income groups and may even spill over to industries in practice. 
Against the original intention of assisting disadvantaged groups, the universal energy subsidy 
benefits accrue disproportionately to higher income groups as the poor overall consumes much less 
energy. Over-consumption arising from subsidized prices also tends to increase import demand of 
net energy importers or reduce exports by net energy exporters, which will deteriorate the country’s 
balance of payments and raise concerns on energy security. These environmental, economic and 
social concerns have motivated governments and international organizations to vote for removing 
energy subsidies.  
An evolving trend towards no or less energy subsidies originated in OECD countries during the 
1990s, and has spread to developing and transmission economies gradually. For developed countries, 
environmental problems (especially climate change) and the goal for sustainable development are 



































































wealthy countries have made great efforts to reduce the distortions in energy markets (OECD, 
1997a). On the other hand, economic growth is the primary concern of developing and transmission 
countries. Usually it is pressure from international community or/and financial burden on fiscal 
budget that force them to reform energy subsidies.   
Particularly, subsidies to fossil fuels are prevailing and serious in the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), which amounted to $51 billion in 2011 (IEA, 2013). Even so, Malaysia is 
an outstanding example in the neighborhood. In 2011, the share of after-tax fossil fuel subsidies to 
GDP was roughly 7.2% in Malaysia, only less than 8.4% in Brunei but much higher than the world 
average of 2.7% (Clements et al., 2013). In terms of the ratio of energy subsidies to overall 
government budgets, Malaysia had the highest ratio in ASEAN at about 32.9%, which was much 
higher than the world average of 8.1% (Clements et al., 2013). Estimates show that higher-income 
groups got more than 70% of the fuel subsidies in Malaysia (NEAC, 2009). Table 1 gives an 
overview of Malaysia’s subsidy policies for fossil fuels.
1
 Generally, budget for petroleum subsidies 
in Malaysia has grown substantially overtime since 2000. Gas subsidies provided indirectly by 
PETRONAS do not explicitly appear on the fiscal budget, but implicitly affects government 
revenue through reduced corporate tax base. The amount of PETRONAS’ forgone revenue is much 
larger than petroleum subsidies in size. 
Malaysian government proposed to gradually rationalize commodity subsidies in the “2010-
2015 Malaysia Plan”, motivated by rising budget deficit and national debt, dwindling current 
account surplus and currency depreciation partially due to lacking actions to cut budget deficit 
(IISD, 2014). However, the initial government plans did not succeed, except an ad hoc increase of 
petroleum price in September 2013 (see Table 1).  Only the low oil price at the end of 2014 finally 
                                            
1 Electricity consumers may receive monthly rebate and even a discount on bills (e.g. government schools and welfare 
homes). As the amount is small if compared with subsidies to fossil fuels, direct electricity subsidy would not be 



































































made it possible for Malaysia to overhaul fossil fuel subsidies to some extent (Adam and Pakiam, 
2014). But the fundamentals of petroleum subsidy policy has not been changed, and it is not clear 
whether the fossil fuels subsidies will come back if the oil prices increase again (Shi, 2016).
2
  
However, while the majority of citizens may support the subsidy rationalization policy, the rest 
who are not willing to part with the subsidies may hamper the reform. A poll conducted by the 
government shows that 61% of the Malaysian public supported reducing subsidies (IISD, 2013). 
The 2013 adjustment still incurred fierce oppositions from political parties and the public, and 
triggered several protests across Malaysia due to corruption concerns and doubts on the 
government’s promises (IISD, 2014). Therefore, it is timely to investigate the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of different reform schemes, identify the most vulnerable sectors and income 
groups, and evaluate potential compensation to households. A static computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) framework is developed based on Malaysia’s input-output (I-O) tables to implement the 
assessment. 
 Compared to existing studies on energy subsidies in Malaysia, this paper contributes to the 
literature in the four aspects. First, households are disaggregated into four groups by income so that 
the differential impacts of fuel subsidy reform on different income groups and compensation 
policies targeting the poor could be analyzed. Second, in addition to petroleum subsidies that are the 
major topic in previous studies, natural gas subsidy provided by state-owned gas supplier is also 
analyzed in this study. Third, different settings are simulated for the use of saved budget or 
increased tax revenue stemming from subsidy reform, which could provide policy makers a range of 
potential impacts depending on government behavior. Last, this study uses the recently released 
Malaysia’s 2010 I-O tables, while previous CGE studies are based on its 2005 or older I-O tables.  
                                            
2
 An Incentive Based Regulation framework for natural gas was scheduled to be introduced in January 2016, but so far 



































































The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews literature on energy subsidies and 
studies relevant to Malaysia. Section 3 introduces the CGE model and scenario settings. Simulation 
results and interpretations are reported in Section 4. The last section discusses the policy 
implications and concludes the paper.  
 
2. Literature Review 
Although advocated by economists and environmentalists, not all the interest groups support 
abolishing energy subsidy. Major opponent opinions are that disadvantaged groups would not be 
able to couple with the market prices of fuels and electricity, and firms would face higher 
production costs which would be partially passed on to consumers and partially undertaken by the 
firms. In other words, the general public and also the industries would not support such policy. The 
debates have been ongoing for decades, and public protests or even riots took place when some 
countries attempted to revise exiting policies for energy subsidy. For example, when the 
government raised the petroleum prices by 23% on February 2006, the public expressed their 
dissatisfaction and anger through protests (Bacon and Kojima, 2006). Moreover, fuel subsidy 
removal is also often used as a weapon in domestic politics (Shi and Kimura, 2014). 
Along with the years of debates and practices, a large body of research has been conducted to 
investigate energy subsidy related issues. The research was primarily initiated and has been driven 
by international organizations such as the United Nations, World Bank, OECD and IEA. Early 
studies made great efforts in estimating the extent of energy price distortions or the amount of 
subsidies provided (e.g. Kosmo, 1989; Larsen and Shah, 1992; Koplow, 1993; IEA, 1994 and 1995; 
Larsen, 1994; Larsen and Shah, 1995). Several metrics, such as the divergence between actual and 
“undistorted” prices, producer support estimate, consumer support estimate and aggregate measure 



































































With the implementation of energy subsidy reform over the world, qualitative literature focus 
on lessons learned from past experience, challenges for reform and the design of optimal strategies 
for governments to smooth the reform path based on country-specific conditions (e.g. OECD, 1996, 
1997b, 1998, 2005 and 2013; IEA and UNEP, 2001; UNEP, 2004 and 2008; World Bank, 2010). 
Quantitative literature usually uses numerical models to analyze economic, environmental and 
welfare impacts of energy subsidies (e.g. Burniaux et al., 1992; Light, 1999; Anderson and 
McKibbin, 2000; OECD, 2000; Burniaux and Chateau, 2011; Burniaux et al., 2011; Liu and Li, 
2011; UNDP, 2012; Acar and Yeldan, 2016; Dennis, 2016; Rentschler, 2016). As the quantitative 
studies differ in scope, methodology and years of reference, the results obtained are quite diverse 
and not directly comparable. Among others, CGE modeling- a macroeconomic framework based on 
general equilibrium theory- is the most common approach adopted to quantify the impacts of 
subsidy reform. Most quantitative studies at global and regional levels by international 
organizations and institutes are based on CGE modelling (e.g. OECD, 2013; UNEP, 2014). 
Studies on energy subsidies relevant to Malaysia also appeared in the recent literature. IISD 
(2013) reviewed Malaysia’s energy subsidies by fuel type and identified experiences that could be 
useful to Malaysia from efforts to reform energy subsidies in other countries. IISD (2014) focused 
on Malaysia’s fuel subsidy reform in 2013, and discussed lessons learned from the reform. There 
are also some quantitative studies using CGE models and Malaysia’s 2005 I-O tables. Solaymani 
and Kari (2014) evaluated the impacts of removing petroleum subsidy and electricity rebate on 
Malaysia, with a focus on the transportation sector. They show that the outputs of land transport, 
water transport and air transport would decrease by 3.5%, 1.2% and 2.1%, respectively. Similarly, 
Solaymani et al. (2015) investigated energy subsidy reform and the resulting change in travel 
behaviours of rural, urban and noncitizen households. Solaymani et al. (2014) explored the impacts 



































































discovered that poverty levels among rural households would increase more significantly than urban 
households. Solaymani (2016) focused on the poverty and income inequality impacts of energy 
subsidy reform, and found that urban households would suffer more than rural and noncitizen 
households.  
The several quantitative studies discussed above focus on certain industries or differentiated 
impacts on household groups by ethnic or residential area. Since identifying the most vulnerable 
group is essential for targeted policy measures, efforts are made in this paper on disaggregating 
households by income level based on Malaysia’s household income and expenditure surveys in 
2009/2010. The disaggregation allows comparing different impacts of fuel subsidy reform on 
different income groups and also assessing the effectiveness and economic feasibility of 
compensation policies targeting disadvantaged groups, which are not seen in existing literature. 
Increased commodity prices due to higher energy prices after subsidy removal were expected to hurt 
the poor more than high income groups (IISD, 2013).  
Indirect natural gas subsidies provided by PETRONAS have different funding from petroleum 
subsidies. And more than half of Malaysia’s electricity is generated by natural gas. Given the 
magnitude of gas subsidies, it is worthwhile to investigate its transmission mechanisms of gas 
subsidies individually. Therefore, unlike existing studies that focus on petroleum subsidies or 
analyze government subsides/energy subsidies as a whole, analysis of gas subsidies is within the 
scope of this paper. The saved budget from subsidy removal in the existing studies is not planned 
for any other use other than cutting budget deficit. This assumption is also considered as the default 
setting in this paper, but spending the saved budget or increased government revenue on 
infrastructure development or/and education, health and other public services is additionally 
evaluated as alternative options for the government to better utilize the extra funding. Last, the latest 



































































reform initiative than the 2005 version of I-O tables used in previous studies. This is because during 
the Mahathir’s premiership up to 2003, subsidy was mainly in the form of forgone tax revenue- 
little in direct subsidy (Thillainathan 2009; Hamid and Rashid 2012). The amount of fuel subsidies 
was kept at unsustainable level in more recent years.  
 
3. Methodology and Data 
In this paper, a static Malaysian CGE model is developed to quantify the potential impacts of 
energy subsidy reform. In the model, the behaviors of each agent, such as households, firms and the 
government, are specified by a system of non-linear functions. When an external shock comes, the 
interactions of these agents would lead the economy to a new equilibrium. Comparing equilibriums 
obtained under different scenarios can provide policy makers insights into long-run economic 
planning and policy-making. Therefore, CGE model has been widely used in analysis of 
government regulation, tax reform, trade liberation, regional cooperation and environmental issues 
(e.g., Hudson and Jorgenson, 1974; Ballard et al., 1985; Martin et al., 1992; Harrison and 
Rutherford, 1999; Dixon, 2006; Hosoe, 2006; Perali et al., 2012; Parrado and De Cian, 2014). 
To be consistent with the classification of I-O tables and household income and expenditure 
survey, the Malaysian economy in this study is divided into 15 non-energy sectors
3
, i.e. Agriculture, 
Food & Wear, Wood & Paper, Chemicals & Metal, Machinery, Vehicles, Construction, Wholesale & 
Retail trade, Hotel & Restaurant, Transport, Communications & Amusement, Housing, Education, 
Health, Other services, and 5 energy sectors, i.e. Electricity, Crude Oil, Natural Gas, Other Mining, 
Petroleum.
4
 The Natural Gas sector in this study is an aggregate of natural gas and gas sectors in the 
                                            
3
 For ease of calculation, the data treatment scheme-1 is used to match the I-O classification and energy classification 
(Su et al., 2010). 
4
 In Malaysia’s I-O tables, coal is not separately listed but included in the Other Mining sector. More than one third of 



































































I-O tables. Each sector is assumed to have one representative producer. The economy has four 
representative households, which represents the lowest 15% (H1), lower-middle 40% (H2), upper-




3.1. The model 
Figure 1 describes the nested production structure for all sectors, which consists of three broad 
categories of inputs: factor inputs (i.e. labor and capital), energy inputs and non-energy intermediate 
inputs (see Eqs. A1-A6 in the Appendix A). Domestic input and imported input of the same variety 
are treated as imperfect substitute in production, and aggregated using a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) function. The fossil fuel bundle, energy bundle, capital-labor bundle and capital-
labor-energy bundle are all CES aggregations. Following a Leontief function, the capital-labor-
energy input and non-energy intermediate inputs are then aggregated into the gross output, which is 
either supplied to domestic market or exported. At each level of the production structure, the 
producer is assumed to choose a bundle of inputs that maximizes profit (i.e. revenue minus costs for 
factor inputs/energy inputs/non-energy intermediate inputs and taxes, etc.) subject to its production 
technology. Subsidies to petroleum, gas and other commodities enter profit functions as negative 
costs or effective revenues, and will affect the effective prices of composites at corresponding 
production levels. The influence of subsidies will be transmitted up to the gross output along the 
production structure. For crude oil, natural gas, other mining and petroleum, domestic supply and 
exports are not differentiated. For the remaining sectors, the gross output is further transformed into 
domestic commodity and export commodity using a constant elasticity of transformation function. 
Similar to production, the firm also maximizes profit subjection to transformation function. 
                                            
5
 The household survey data is used to differentiate the households into four income groups. Similar technique is used in 



































































The representative households receive factor income by supplying capital and labor inputs, and 
receive transfer payments from the government and the rest of the world (ROW). After paying 
income taxes and making non-tax payments to the government, the households consume 
commodities and save. As the Malaysian government has a budget deficit, part of the household 
savings is lent to the government to close its budget deficit. The lending could be interpreted as 
equivalent to purchasing government bond. The total consumption of each representative household 
is subject to its budget constraint. The consumption of each commodity j and the respective shares 
of domestic commodity j and imported commodity j are determined following a nested CES 
structure (see Eqs. A7-A8 in the Appendix A).  
Government revenue is mainly from tax collection. According to the data, taxes in the model 
include (1) labor income tax, (2) capital income tax, (3) production tax on gross output, (4) sale tax 
on final consumption and investment, and (5) sale tax on exports. Tax revenue and non-tax 
payments as well as with borrowings from the households allow the government to spend on goods 
and services such as education, health and national defence, save for development investment, 
provide subsidies, and also make transfer payments to the households and the ROW. In this study, 
government subsidies are provided for products of the Agriculture, Food & Wear, Chemical & 
Metal and Petroleum sectors. The total government consumption is a composition of commodities, 
each of which is a CES combination of domestic and imported products, following a Cobb-Douglas 
function (see Eqs. A9-A10 in the Appendix A). That is, the government is assumed to consume each 
variety of commodity in a fixed proportion of the total government consumption. 
Domestic savings by government and households as well as foreign savings arising from trade 
balance are assumed to be entirely used on investment. Similar to the government consumption, the 
total investment is also based on a Cobb-Douglas function and the substitution between domestic 



































































market-clear conditions for commodities, labor and capital, several other assumptions are made to 
close the model: (a) household saving rates are exogenous, (b) government saving rate is exogenous 
or government savings are exogenous depending on scenarios, (c) prices of exports and imports are 
exogenous, and (d) foreign savings are fixed while the exchange rate is floating. 
 
3.2. Data 
The SAM is constructed according to the framework presented in Section 3.1. Economic data 
used are mainly from Malaysia’s I-O Table 2010 (DOS, 2014) and Malaysia’s Statistics Handbook 
(DOS, 2011b). According to the data, GDP and total exports of Malaysia in the base year 2010 were 
around RM 825.4 billion and 643.6 billion, respectively. The Malaysian government had RM 121.5 
billion of tax revenue and RM 50.1 billion of non-tax revenue, and spent RM 106.5 billion on 
commodities (mainly education, health, public administration, defence and public order, and other 
public services), RM 52.8 billion on infrastructure development (i.e. government savings), RM 32.6 
billion on transfer payments and RM 12.4 billion on commodity subsidies. As a result, the 
government had a budget deficit of approximately RM 32.6 billion in 2010. Most parameter values 
used in the simulation such as tax rates and saving rates are calibrated on a basis of the SAM, but 
elasticities of substitution/transformation in production, consumption and investment functions are 
set in line with those used in the MIT EPPA model (e.g. Paltsev et al., 2005), the GTAP model (e.g. 
Huff et al., 1997) and Solaymani and Kari (2014). 
The household disaggregation is based on information from the Malaysia Household Income 
and Basic Amenities Survey Report 2009 and Malaysia Report on Household Expenditure Survey 
2009 (DOS, 2011a and 2012). The figures show that income inequality is quite serious in Malaysia- 
the bottom 15% of households (H1) receive around 4% of total income while the top 15% of 



































































sectoral consumption of fossil fuels, retail fuel prices in Malaysia, etc., are obtained from the 
Malaysia National Energy Balance and Malaysia Energy Statistics Handbook (EC, 2012 and 2015). 
These data are utilized to disaggregate crude oil & natural gas sector and electricity & gas sector in 
the I-O tables and calculate CO2 emissions from fossil fuel combustion. Using emissions factors 





4. Simulation and Results 
Three broad categories of scenarios are designed for the assessment, which are (1) no 
petroleum subsidies, (2) no gas subsidy and (3) no petroleum and gas subsidies. For gas subsidy, 
removal in power sector only and complete removal (i.e. in power, industries and commercial 
sectors) are simulated separately as sub-scenarios. As cutting budget deficit is the primary incentive 
for the government to abandon subsidy policy, fiscal expenditure is by default set to be fixed at the 
level in 2010. But another extreme situation, to relocate the saved budget or increased government 
revenue on consumption of education, health and other public services, etc. and infrastructure 
development as in 2010 (i.e. floating setting), is also considered as an alternative. While the 
sustainability of fiscal system discourages the floating expenditure setting, providing better 
infrastructure and more public services can explicitly show the public that the government is 
utilizing the freed budget or increased revenue in a more beneficial way. 
7
 
In this study, direct government transfer is chosen as the compensation option for the most 
                                            
6
 Emissions from gas flaring reinjection & use (specified in the National Energy Balance table) is not considered here. 
7
 In-between options could be using the money entirely on (i) consumption of commodities, or (ii) savings for 
infrastructure development, respectively. Simulated macro impacts are close to those under the floating setting in 
scenario (i), and almost the same to those under the fixed setting in scenario (ii). Considering the length of the paper, the 





































































 It is argued in the literature that targeted cash transfer tends to outperform 
universal subsidies and other types of transfers for advantages such as low leakage, less distortion to 
markets and incentives, low administrative cost (World Bank, 2010). In the context of Malaysia, the 
recipients can be easily identified through the individual income tax collection system or the 
existing framework used for transfer payments of the BR1M program. The compensation is 
provided to the point that the bottom 15% households (H1) are no worse than the baseline status. 
Table 2 summarizes the major scenario assumptions. In all the simulations, the gross outputs of 
Crude oil, Natural Gas, Other Mining and Petroleum sectors are fixed at their 2010 capacities based 
on these sectors’ production features in the short run. Outputs that cannot be absorbed in domestic 
markets are assumed to be entirely exported. 
 
4.1. Impacts of subsidy removal with fixed fiscal expenditure 
Table 3 displays the simulated macro impacts of petroleum and gas subsidy removal, with fiscal 
expenditure fixed and no compensation provided to the most disadvantaged groups. Theoretically, 
removing fuel subsidies would induce more efficient distribution of resources among different 
sectors and improve economic efficiency. But higher price also means higher production cost and a 
subsequent increase in overall price level. This is one of the potential reasons for diverse evaluation 
results obtained in the literature.  
In the case of Malaysia, GDP would increase by 0.07% (or RM 0.60 billion) when petroleum 
subsidies are completely removed. Total exports increase by 1.01% (or RM 6.5 billion), which is 
dominated by the Machinery and Petroleum. According to the I-O data, the Machinery sector 
accounts for more than one third of Malaysia’s total exports, and is not petroleum intensive. As a 
result, the sector benefits from resource relocation from more intensive sectors and expands. And 
                                            
8
 Labor income tax rebate to H1 have almost identical impacts as direct government transfer payment. The simulation 



































































higher price lowers the country’s consumption of petroleum, so that more petroleum products are 
available for exports. The petroleum sector contributes to 7% of Malaysia’s total exports. As 
expected, budget deficit declines significantly by 28.2% (or RM 9.2 billion), and total carbon 
emissions reduce by 1.84% (or 3.5 million ton CO2). For households, lower-income groups tend to 
be slightly less affected than higher-income groups, which is mainly because petroleum products 
account for a larger proportion in the consumption baskets of higher income groups. Intuitively, 
automobiles and even motorbikes are not affordable to the poor, so the price shock to diesel and 
gasoline has smaller direct impacts on them.  
Economic gain tends to be much larger when the subsidy reform is on gas, but the impact on 
exports and households are different from the petroleum case. GDP is simulated to increase by 
0.28% (or RM 2.3 billion) when natural gas sold to power generators are no longer subsidized and 
0.53% (or RM 4.4 billion) when gas subsidy is completely removed in power, industries and 
commercial sectors. However, exports would decline in these two sub-scenarios. And again, the 
trend is mainly driven by the sinking exports of machinery and petroleum products. The Machinery 
sector is electricity intensive and thus suffers from higher electricity price as a result of 
unsubsidized power generation form natural gas. Producers and households would more or less 
switch from more expensive natural gas and electricity towards domestic petroleum, since 
substitution exists across different fuels as well as between fossil fuel and electricity. Therefore, the 
amount of petroleum products available for exports reduces. The saved gas subsidy does not 
directly go to the government, but becomes the producer’s operating surplus or capital income. 
Budget deficit reduction here mainly arises from higher tax revenue, and is thus much smaller than 
in the case of removing petroleum subsidies.  
Quite the contrary, carbon emissions reduction is more than doubled than in Scenario 1a. The 



































































generated by natural gas while less than 5% by petroleum products. Relatively, the emission 
reduction is smaller in the complete removal scenario as more energy is needed for the higher 
economic/GDP growth. For households, the lower-income groups are moderately or negligibly 
affected by the gas subsidy removal, and higher-income households are even better off in both sub-
scenarios. The explanation is that: first, natural gas used by households are not initially subsidized 
so that all the households are only indirectly affected by the increase in the price of electricity and 
other commodities; second, every income group can benefit from the economic growth to some 
degree; third, the previously forgone revenue turns into capital income, which is then distributed to 
households following the patterns in the household income survey. Obviously, the higher-income 
groups would receive much higher proportions of the redistributed benefits than the lower-income 
groups.  
When the reform proceeds to both petroleum and gas subsidies, the macro impacts are close to, 
but not equal to, the accumulated impacts of individual cases. The figures show that GDP would 
grow more than the sum in separate reforms. When all the fuel subsidies are removed, GDP could 
increase by 0.65% (or RM 5.4 billion), which is a significant change in any country. While 
removing the two types of fuels subsidies has opposite impacts on exports, the net impacts of 
removing both turn to be positive. The thorough reform in Scenario 3a could also reduce around 1/3 
of the budget deficit (or RM 11.4 billion) and 6% of total carbon emissions (or 11.1 million ton 
CO2), which in principle achieves the primary target of the government and meanwhile implies that 
fuel subsidy reform could be an important policy instrument for Malaysia to mitigate climate 
change and achieve its INDC target. As the impacts of removing petroleum subsidies dominate, all 
household groups would be affected by the complete reform. But the net impacts tend to be slightly 




































































Table 4 shows how sectoral outputs are affected by fuel subsidy reforms. The general 
observation is that petroleum intensive sectors are more affected by petroleum subsidy removal and 
electricity intensive sectors are more affected by gas subsidy removal. For example, the agriculture 
sector and transport sector are petroleum intensive, so their outputs decrease due to higher 
production costs when petroleum subsidies are removed but increase due to relocation of labor and 
capital from more affected sectors when gas subsidy is removed.  On the other hand, the machinery 
sector is electricity intensive, so its output increases in petroleum subsidy removal scenario but 
decreases in gas subsidy removal scenario.  
 
4.2. Impacts of subsidy removal with floating fiscal expenditure 
Table 5 displays the macro impacts of fuel subsidy removals for the floating fiscal expenditure 
setting. The saved budget is set to be invested in infrastructure and spent on education, health and 
other public services as in the base year. Again, no compensation is provided to the lowest income 
households yet. 
When only petroleum subsidies are removed, the increase in GDP by 0.04% (or RM 0.31 
billion) tends to be smaller than in the fixed fiscal expenditure setting. As education, health and 
other public services are primarily produced and consumed domestically, the increased government 
expenditure on them stimulates relocation of resources to these sectors. Correspondingly, other 
sectors have to shrink and their exports would decrease. Also because of the re-spending of the 
saved subsidy, budget deficit would slightly decrease by 0.53% (or RM 0.17 billion) and 
government consumption would shoot up by 8.19% (or RM 8.7 billion). The service-dominated and 
thus less energy intensive government consumption consequently leads to greater carbon emissions 




































































All four household groups are worse off due to rising price level after the petroleum subsidy 
removal. The pattern that lower-income groups are relatively less affected remains. Interestingly, 
even if compared to the impacts in the fixed fiscal expenditure setting, the lower-income groups are 
less affected as well. The potential reasons could be: first, the shares of income received by lower 
income groups are relatively higher in the education, health and other services sectors than the 
average. So lower income groups could benefit from growth in these sectors stemming from more 
government consumption. Second, the extra government expenditure would increase supply of 
education, health and other services (mainly public administration) or/and enlarge government 
coverages of tuition fee and healthcare cost, etc. Regardless the exact policy tools, all income 
groups would be able to consume more these services at lower prices.      
For gas subsidy removal, there is almost no difference in GDP growth between the fixed and 
floating fiscal expenditure scenarios. But exports would drop more in the floating setting due to the 
increased government expenditure on domestic services. As gas subsidies are provided by 
PETRONAS, removing gas subsidies can only indirectly affect the fiscal budget through higher tax 
revenue. According to fiscal expenditure style in 2010, the government spends more than its income. 
Therefore, budget deficit and government consumption both end up with an increase in the two sub-
scenarios. The impacts on carbon emissions reduction and different income groups are quite similar 
to those in the fixed fiscal expenditure sub-scenarios. Particularly, when gas subsidies are removed 
in all sectors, even the lowest-income group would be slightly better off than the baseline.  
As in Scenario 3a, the macro impacts are close to the accumulated impacts of individual cases 
when all fuel subsidies are removed. Budget deficit would almost remain unchanged after the 
impacts of removing petroleum and gas subsidies offset with each other. As in separate removal 




































































Table 6 shows the response of each sector to the fuel subsidy reforms. The major differences 
between the results in Table 4 and Table 6 lie in the Education, Health and Other Services sectors. 
The three sectors are overall moderately affected in the fixed fiscal expenditure scenarios, but 
significantly expand with the increased government expenditure on them. The expansion also 
causes resource re-allocation within the economy and makes other sectors also more or less perform 
differently than in Table 4. The impacts on some sectors, such as Vehicles, Construction and 
Housing, would even reverse in some sub-scenarios.   
 
4.3. Impacts of compensation policy 
In addition to household consumption in volume, compensating variation (CV) and equivalent 
variation (EV) are also considered in this study to discuss the loss of welfare arising from energy 
subsidy removal. Intuitively, CV refers to the amount of money a household must be compensated 
for the price changes, and EV refers to the amount of money a household would accept in lieu of the 
price changes (see Eqs. A13-A14 in the Appendix A). Negative sign implies that the price changes 
would make the household worse off.   
Table 7 lists the simulated CV and EV values for each income group, the signs of which are 
consistent with household consumption in volume.
9
 The figures imply that, compared to the huge 
amount of fuel subsidies provided directly or indirectly, the government does not need to pay much 
to compensate households’ loss of welfare stemming from the subsidy reforms. For example, to 
make the bottom 15% of households no worse off than baseline, less than RM 0.3 billion is required. 
Even if the compensation extends to the lower-middle 40% of households, the total transfer 
payment needed is less than 15% of petroleum subsidies paid in 2010.   
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Both direct government transfer and labor income tax rebate are considered as potential 
compensation policy instruments. Although different in transmission mechanism, the simulation 
results show that the two compensation instruments are almost indifferent in terms of economic 
impacts. To save space, only the impact of direct government transfer are reported here. No 
compensation is needed in Scenario 2b_PIC as all income groups are better off after the reform. In 
this study, the compensation is provided to the point that the bottom 15% households (H1) are no 
worse than the baseline status. Figures in Table 8 show that compensating the lowest income group 
would have almost no additional impacts on GDP, exports, carbon emissions reduction and the other 
three uncompensated income groups. Only budget deficit and government consumption would 
display slightly larger differences from their counterparts in Table 4 and Table 6. 
 
 
5. Discussions and Conclusion  
In ASEAN, subsidies not only discourage development of clean energy, fossil fuel exploration 
and infrastructure investment, prevent integration of energy markets as required by the ASEAN 
Economic Community, but also limit the possibility to optimize the trade of low-carbon resources. 
Reform of fossil fuel subsidies, together with promotion of renewables and energy efficiency, 
regional market integration and connectivity, are key instruments to achieving a cleaner, and more 
sustainable energy mix for ASEAN (Shi, 2016). Low oil prices in recent few years provide an 
appropriate timing of fuel subsidy removal, the delay of which will primarily increase costs for the 
government and leave little room for policy space when energy prices are higher than expected (Wu 
et al., 2012).  
This study quantitatively investigates the impacts of removing fuel subsidies on Malaysia’s 
economic performance, household welfare and carbon emissions. A dedicated Malaysia CGE model 



































































differentiated impacts on households. The simulation results demonstrate that removing fuel 
subsidies could improve economic efficiency and relocate resources to less energy intensive sectors, 
producing both economic and environment benefits. In the interest of economic gain, all fuel 
subsidies should be removed to maximize the GDP growth. But from the perspective of climate 
change mitigation, retaining gas subsidy in industries and commercial sectors is favored, because 
slightly higher reduction in carbon emissions could be achieved. However, the small amount of 
additional emissions reduction would be at the expense of nearly halved GDP growth, which seems 
not worth.  
Households at all income levels would be worse off in most scenarios as the impacts of rising 
price level dominate. In petroleum subsidy scenarios, lower income groups tend to suffer less than 
their high income peers because petroleum products account for smaller portions in their 
consumption baskets. In gas subsidy removal scenarios, the two high income groups (H3 and H4) 
are always better off than baseline. This is because gas subsidy removal turns the gas supplier’s 
forgone revenue into operating surplus or capital income, which is then distributed disproportionally 
to different income groups. The small shares received by the two low income groups (H1 and H2) 
can hardly or narrowly help offset the impacts of higher price level. From the public policy 
perspective, protection of disadvantaged groups is one of the key tasks for the government. The 
simulated results demonstrate that compensation policy through direct transfer payment could make 
the poorest income group no worse than baseline while have almost no extra impacts on GDP 
growth and emissions reduction. 
A comparison of the simulation results between fixed fiscal expenditure and floating 
expenditure shows that the two setting have their respective advantages. The former setting is 
featured with significant reductions in budget deficit, which is the primary intention of the reform. 



































































reduction. More importantly, all income groups except for the top 15% households will be less 
affected in the floating expenditure scenarios because of the increased supplies of education, health 
and other public services by the government. At sectoral level, changes in outputs differ across 
sectors and display no common preference over any specific scenario. Generally, petroleum 
intensive sectors are more affected by petroleum subsidy removal, while electricity intensive sectors 
are more affected by gas subsidy removal. 
The first policy impaction based on the simulation results is that fuel subsidies should be 
phased out completely. However, although the simulation results support complete removal, the 
politically sensitivity demands holistic approach, strategic planning and actions (Shi, 2016). While 
preparation of subsides removal will take time, there is no excuse to delay initial actions, such as 
public education and information campaign (Shi, 2016). Communications to the public and 
industries are particularly important, especially in an energy-producing country where the citizens 
take low energy prices for granted (OECD, 2013). Traditional media, official websites, roadshows 
and public workshops, etc., are all useful platforms to communicate why the reform must be carried 
out, in what ways the saved subsidy cost would be utilized and how the vulnerable groups would be 
protected, as well the public’s feedback and concerns. The effectiveness of the communications 
depends on the public’s trust in the government, which is in turn firmly related to the transparency 
and credibility of the government.  
The second policy implication is on the use of the saved or increased budget. For the benefit of 
immediate fiscal deficit reduction and economic growth, the fiscal expenditure should be fixed. 
However, increasing expenditure on education, health and other services sectors could alleviate the 
welfare loss of most households due to more services available to them at lower prices, which 
makes it easier to gain their supports for the reform. Furthermore, more schools and hospitals, less 



































































observed. The public will know that the government takes away their fuel subsidies but is utilizing 
the money on citizens in an alternative way. Additionally, the increased education is an investment 
in future productivity, and will earn the country more growth potential in the long run. Therefore, it 
is crucial for the government to balance between cutting budget deficit and supplying more 
education, healthcare and other public services. 
Last, compensation schedule is necessary and can be affordable. Compensation schedule that 
make the bottom 15% household not worsen off would cost little when compared with the save cost. 
Furthermore, given the simulated economic benefits and also to reduce opposition, it may be 
possible to extend the compensation to households of income group H2 and even industries that 
significantly lose competitiveness without the subsidies. However, based on other countries 
experiences, it is essential to make it explicit that the compensation is temporary in design (OECD, 
2013). Otherwise, the support may turn into another type of distortion and burden if people 
considered it as entitled. In implementation, the rules of the compensation should be transparent so 
as to avoid unnecessary concerns over corruption and abuse. Direct government transfer is one of 
the most feasible options for Malaysia based on the country’s exiting institutional infrastructures, 
but the exact magnitude, scope and coverage as well as other complementary instruments require 
more in-depth considerations and discussions beyond the simulations in this study. 
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Appendix A. Key Model Specifications 
1. Production Activity 
The gross output of sector j ( jY ) is produced following a multi-level nested production 
structure. At each level of the production structure, the firm maximizes profits (i.e. revenue minus 
costs for factor inputs, intermediate inputs and taxes, etc.) subject to production technology. 
Capital ( jK ) and labor ( jL ) are combined first into a capital-labor input ( jKL ) following a 
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function: 
, , ,
1
, , ,( )
KL j KL j KL j
j KL j K j j L j jKL a K L
  
                                                                                               (A1) 
where ,KL ja is the scaling coefficient of jKL  input production, ,K j and ,L j are respectively the input 










is the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and labor.  
In Malaysia, there are mainly four types of fossil fuel input: crude oil, gas, petroleum and other 
mining (coal included). All of them are CES aggregates of domestically processed and directly 




, , ,( )
FF j FF j
j FF j F j i jFF a F
 
                                                                                                          (A2) 
where ,F ja is the scaling coefficient of jFF  input production, ,F j is the input share coefficient of the 











is the elasticity of substitution among the fossil fuel inputs.  
The total energy input ( jE ) is a CES composite of the aggregate fossil fuel input and electricity 
( jELC ): 
, , ,
1
, , ,( )
E j E j E j
j E j FF j j ELC j jE a FF ELC
  
                                                                                          (A3) 













































































is the elasticity of substitution between the fossil 
fuel input and electricity.  
Then the capital-labor input and energy input are combined into the capital-labor-energy input 
( jKLE ) following a CES function: 
, , ,
1
, , ,( )
KLE j KLE j KLE j
j KLE j KL j j E j jKLE a KL E
  
                                                                                     (A4) 
where ,KLE ja is the scaling coefficient of jKLE  input production, ,KL j and ,E j are the input share 










is the elasticity of substitution between the 
capital-labor input and energy input.  
Finally, h non-energy intermediate inputs ( jIN ) and the capital-labor-energy input are 
aggregated into gross output following a Leontief function: 
1, 2, ,
1, 2, , ,
min( , ,..., , )
j j h j j
j
j j h j KLE j
IN IN IN KLE
Y
   
                                                                                           (A5) 
where ,h j  and ,KLE j  are the input requirement coefficients of the h -th non-energy intermediate 
input and the capital-labor-energy input for a unit output of jY , respectively. Each non-energy 
intermediate input is a CES composite of domestic and imported commodities of the same variety. 
For some of the sectors, the gross output is further transformed into domestic commodities 
( jD ) and export commodities ( jX ) using a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function: 
, , ,
1
, , ,( )
Y j Y j Y j
j Y j D j j X j jY a D X
  
                                                                                                    (A6) 
where ,Y ja  is the scaling coefficient of the transformation, ,D j  and ,X j  are respectively the output 











the elasticity of transformation for gross output j . 
 
2. Household  
Household income are mainly from payments for factor inputs and transfer payment from the 



































































commodities, savings, non-tax payments to the government and transfer payment to the rest of the 
world. The representative household is assumed to maximize its utility from total consumption ( C ) 
subject to budget constraint.  
For each variety of commodity except for electricity, the household have both domestic and 
imported choices. So the consumption of each commodity ( iC ) is a CES composite of consumption 
of domestic commodity ( iDC ) and consumption of imported commodity ( iMC ): 
, , ,




C i C i C i
C i C i C i C i C i
i DC i i MC i iC DC MC
  




                                                                                           (A7) 
where ,DC i  and ,MC i  are respectively the consumption share coefficients that sum up to 1, and 
,C i is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported commodities of variety i .  
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                                                                                                                  (A8) 
where ,H i is the consumption share of composite commodity i  that sum up to 1, and ,H i is the 
elasticity of substitution among commodities. 
 
3. Government  
Government collects tax and non-tax revenues, which are partly saved for 
development/infrastructure investment and partly spent on consumption of commodities. So total 
government consumption (G ) is assumed to be a composition of consumption of commodities ( iG ) 




                                                                                                                                 (A9) 
where ,G i is the consumption share of each commodity in total government consumption and iG  is 
a CES aggregate of domestic commodity ( iDG ) and imported commodity ( iMG ): 
, , ,
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                                                                                         (A10) 
where ,DG i  and ,MG i  are the consumption share coefficients that sum up to 1, and ,G i is the 




































































Household savings, government savings and foreign savings are assumed to be entirely used for 
investment. Similar to government consumption, total investment (V ) is a Cobb-Douglas composite 




                                                                                                                               (A11) 
where ,V i is the consumption share of each commodity in total investment, and investment on each 
individual commodity is a CES composite of domestic commodity ( iDV ) and imported commodity 
( iMV ): 
, , ,




V i V i V i
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                                                                                         (A12) 
where ,DV i  and ,MV i  are the investment share coefficients that sum up to 1, and ,V i is the 
elasticity of substitution between domestic and imported commodities of variety i .  
 
5. Compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) 
In addition to household consumption in volume, compensating variation (CV) and equivalent 
variation (EV) are also considered in this study to discuss the loss of welfare arising from energy 
subsidy removal. CVs refers to the amount of money the s -th household must be compensated for 
the price changes, while EVs  refers to the amount of money the s -th household would accept in 




















                                                                                                                       (A14) 
whand 0sDI  and 
1
sDI  are respectively the disposable income of the s -th household before and after 
the price changes, and 0sp  and 
1
sp  are respectively the consumer price indexes of the s -th household 
before and after the price changes. Negative sign implies that the price changes would make the 
household worse off. 
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Table 1. Overview of Malaysia’s fuel subsidy policies 















 Provided by the government 
 Officially, an Automatic Pricing Mechanism 
(APM) used to price petroleum products based 
on factors such as: reference product cost, 




 Actually, APM used to determine sale tax 
exemption or subsidy needed to cover the gap 
between a fixed retail price and the market 
price (IISD, 2013). 
 Based on Malaysia’s official statistics, the 
budget for petroleum subsidies:  
 only RM 27 million in 1990 
 rose to RM 3.2 billion in 2000 
 peaked at RM 17.6 billion in 2008 
 RM 9.6 billion in 2010   












 Provided by PETRONAS, Malaysia’s state-
owned oil and gas company 
 To power generators at around 1/4 of the 
market price  
 To industries and commercial sector at heavily 
subsided prices as well, but lesser than to 
power generators  
 PETRONAS’s foregone revenue in 2010 was 
estimated to be:  
 RM 11.2 billion for gas to power sector  
 RM 7.9 billion for gas to non-power sectors 






 In May 2010, Subsidy Rationalization 
Programme (SRP) was launched, aiming to 
increase the prices of subsidized commodities 
including petroleum products by pre-specified 
amounts every 6 months until 2014 
 Most price adjustments did not take place  
 Suspended in March 2012 
 Government’s concern on cost of living due to 
rising commodity prices (Teoh, 2012)  
 In September 2013, an ad hoc increase in the 
price of diesel and petrol, the first adjustment 
since 2011 
 
 No reform made to the APM.  
 Compensate the poor through extended 
1Malaysia People’s Aid (BR1M) program 
 Upgrade database system for previous welfare 
assistance program 
 At the end of 2014, subsidies for gasoline and 
diesel removed (Adam and Pakiam, 2014) 
 Possible due to diminished gap between 
reference prices and market price due to the 










































































Table 2. Scenario assumptions 
 Fiscal Expenditure 
 Fixed Floating 
Scenario 1. No petroleum subsidies 1a 1b 
Scenario 2. No gas subsidy Power only (P) 2a_P 2b_P 
  Power, Industries & Commercial (PIC) 2a_PIC 2b_PIC 
Scenario 3. No petroleum & gas 
subsidies 
Power only (P) 3a_P 3b_P 
Power, Industries & Commercial (PIC) 3a_PIC 3b_PIC 
 
 
Table 3.  Macro impacts with fixed fiscal expenditure in % 
 1a 2a 3a 
  P PIC P PIC 
GDP 0.07 0.28 0.53 0.38 0.65 
Exports 1.01 -0.53 -0.72 0.43 0.21 
Budget deficit -28.2 -3.92 -7.84 -31.7 -35.0 
CO2 emissions -1.84 -4.64 -4.22 -6.37 -5.90 
H1 consumption -1.13 -0.25 -0.01 -1.32 -1.02 
H2 consumption -1.25 -0.09 0.21 -1.27 -0.92 
H3 consumption -1.42 0.08 0.48 -1.25 -0.79 
H4 consumption -1.61 0.23 0.73 -1.28 -0.71 
 
 
Table 4. Impacts on sectoral output with fixed fiscal expenditure in % 
 1a 2a 3a 
 P PIC P PIC 
Agriculture -1.37 0.89 0.61 -0.38 -0.59 
Food & Wear -1.76 1.13 -0.15 -0.52 -1.71 
Wood & Paper -0.45 -0.74 -0.43 -1.09 -0.77 
Chemicals & Metal -2.48 -0.71 -6.27 -2.97 -8.09 
Machinery 3.77 -2.82 -1.89 0.62 1.24 
Vehicles 1.05 0.29 -0.21 1.38 0.87 
Construction 1.99 0.72 0.85 2.71 2.82 
Wholesale & Retail Trade -0.90 0.56 0.86 -0.28 0.07 
Hotel & Restaurant -1.08 -0.20 0.15 -1.21 -0.82 
Transport -4.57 1.30 2.59 -3.20 -1.90 
Communications & Amusement -0.50 -0.25 0.54 -0.73 0.08 
Housing -0.62 0.07 0.50 -0.51 -0.00 
Education -0.46 0.06 0.24 -0.38 -0.17 
Health -0.60 0.04 0.14 -0.53 -0.39 
Other Services -0.15 -0.32 0.04 -0.45 -0.09 



































































Table 5.  Macro impacts with floating fiscal expenditure in % 
 1b 2b 3b 
  P PIC P PIC 
GDP 0.04 0.28 0.53 0.35 0.61 
Exports -0.28 -0.64 -1.00 -0.93 -1.28 
Budget deficit -0.53 0.63 1.11 0.15 0.65 
Government consumption 8.19 0.82 1.73 8.80 9.50 
CO2 emissions -2.09 -4.67 -4.27 -6.63 -6.17 
H1 consumption -0.99 -0.24 0.02 -1.16 -0.86 
H2 consumption -1.11 -0.08 0.23 -1.11 -0.76 
H3 consumption -1.34 0.09 0.50 -1.16 -0.70 




Table 6. Impacts on sectoral output with floating fiscal expenditure in % 
 1b 2b 3b 
 P PIC P PIC 
Agriculture -1.96 0.83 0.48 -1.03 -1.30 
Food & Wear -2.21 1.09 -0.26 -1.02 -2.26 
Wood & Paper -1.58 -0.86 -0.67 -2.31 -2.09 
Chemicals & Metal -4.29 -0.88 -6.65 -4.88 -10.1 
Machinery 1.57 -3.00 -2.34 -1.67 -1.31 
Vehicles -1.88 0.00 -0.82 -1.77 -2.50 
Construction -1.40 0.38 0.13 -0.94 -1.12 
Wholesale & Retail Trade -1.92 0.46 0.63 -1.39 -1.14 
Hotel & Restaurant -0.83 -0.18 0.20 -0.95 -0.54 
Transport -4.92 1.26 2.51 -3.57 -2.31 
Communications & Amusement -0.17 -0.22 0.61 -0.38 0.45 
Housing -0.24 0.10 0.58 -0.11 0.38 
Education 3.89 0.59 1.25 4.41 4.96 
Health 2.68 0.47 0.74 3.12 3.32 
Other Services 2.31 -0.12 0.55 2.13 2.76 















































































Table 7. Compensating variation (CV) and equivalent variation (EV) in Billion RM 
  H1 H2 H3 H4 
1a CV -0.22 -1.27 -2.05 -2.57 
 EV -0.22 -1.25 -2.02 -2.52 
1b CV -0.20 -1.12 -1.92 -2.70 
 EV -0.19 -1.11 -1.91 -2.67 
2a_P CV -0.05 -0.09 0.12 0.37 
 EV -0.05 -0.09 0.12 0.37 
2a_PIC CV 0.00 0.21 0.69 1.16 
 EV 0.00 0.21 0.68 1.15 
2b_P CV -0.05 -0.08 0.13 0.35 
 EV -0.05 -0.08 0.13 0.35 
2b_PIC CV 0.00 0.24 0.71 1.12 
 EV 0.00 0.23 0.71 1.12 
3a_P CV -0.26 -1.29 -1.82 -2.05 
 EV -0.26 -1.27 -1.79 -2.01 
3a_PIC CV -0.20 -0.93 -1.15 -1.13 
 EV -0.20 -0.92 -1.13 -1.11 
3b_P CV -0.23 -1.12 -1.67 -2.18 
 EV -0.23 -1.11 -1.65 -2.15 
3b_PIC CV -0.17 -0.76 -1.01 -1.30 




Table 8. Macro impacts with direct government transfer to the lowest income households (H1) 
in % 
 1a 1b 2a 2b 3a 3b 
   P PIC P P PIC P PIC 
GDP 0.07 0.04 0.28 0.53 0.28 0.38 0.65 0.35 0.61 
Exports 0.99 -0.27 -0.54  -0.64 0.40 0.19 -0.92 -1.28 
Budget deficit -27.5 -0.53 -3.77 -7.84 0.63 -30.9 -34.4 0.14 0.65 
Government consumption - 8.01 - - 0.77 - - 8.59 9.35 
CO2 emissions -1.84 -2.08 -4.64  -4.66 -6.37 -5.89 -6.62 -6.17 
H1 consumption - - - - - - - - - 
H2 consumption -1.26 -1.12 -0.09 0.21 -0.08 -1.27 -0.92 -1.12 -0.76 
H3 consumption -1.42 -1.34 0.08 0.48 0.09 -1.25 -0.79 -1.16 -0.70 
H4 consumption -1.61 -1.70 0.23 0.73 0.22 -1.28 -0.71 -1.37 -0.82 
 
